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Between Discourse and Reality
The Politics of Oil and Ijaw Ethnic Nationalism in the Niger Delta
Kathryn Nwajiaku
1 On 11 December 1998, 500 youths from 40 different clans, together with representatives
from 25 political organisations from an “ethnic” group in the Niger Delta known as the
Ijaw, gathered together in Kaiama, a town in the Kolokuma/Opokuma Local Government
Area (LGA)  of  Bayelsa state.  After prayers,  speeches and much deliberation,  delegates
issued the Kaiama Declaration—a ten-point statement demanding that all oil companies
leave “Ijaw land” by 30 December 1998, pending the resolution by the Nigerian federal
government of questions relating to the ownership and control of petroleum resources
and political autonomy for the Ijaw. Between 29 and 30 December 1998, protest marches
and demonstrations took place throughout Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states and were met
with the full weight of the Nigerian military. Up to 15,000 soldiers and two warships were
sent to Bayelsa by the then military government of General Abusalami Abubakar and a
state of emergency declared. An estimated 200 people died during the events of late 1998
and early 1999, whilst many more were injured, tortured and raped.
2 Around  the  same  time,  violence  prevented  local  government,  State  Assembly  and
governorship elections scheduled for 5 December and 9 January, from taking place until
30 January 1999, some three weeks after elections results were already out elsewhere in
the country. Again in July 2002, dozens of people were killed when two youth groups in
Nembe, Ogboloma/biri 1 in Bayelsa, clashed during the local government primaries for
the ruling People’s  Democratic  Party (PDP).  One of  the groups was  supported by the
former Commissioner for the Environment of the Bayelsa state government,  who has
since fled to the United States, and the other by a manager of President Obasanjo’s 1999
election campaign in Bayelsa 2. In 2003, after the presidential, National Assembly, state
and local government elections had taken place, the Transition Monitoring Group named
Rivers and Bayelsa states, two of the three major oil-producing states (the third being
Delta state) as “states that fell short of minimum acceptable standards for any credible
elections” 3.
3 The Kaiama Declaration and its violent aftermath marked a turning point in Ijaw political
history and a highpoint in the “restiveness” 4 that had become a characteristic feature of
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life in the Niger Delta. The Kaiama Declaration also gave birth to the Ijaw Youth Council (
IYC), an organisation which took upon itself the task of co-ordinating and speaking on
behalf of all Ijaw youth throughout the Delta to ensure the successful realisation of the
goals of the Kaiama Declaration. Many of the brains behind the Kaiama meeting and the
formation of the IYC, young men like Oronto Douglas, Robert Azibola and Von Kemedi,
had been closely involved in campaigning on behalf of the Movement for the Survival of
Ogoni People (MOSOP), which in 1990 issued the Ogoni Bill of Rights and provided a model
for the Kaiama declaration to come. It was in the wake of the disintegration of MOSOP
which followed Saro-Wiwa’s killing in 1995 by the then military regime of General Sani
Abacha, that the IYC emerged to try and do for the Ijaw what MOSOP had tried to do for the
Ogoni.
4 For more than a decade, young men and also a large number of women from different
towns and villages,  different  linguistic  and cultural  communities  as  well  as  different
social backgrounds, had been using “direct action” tactics which specifically targeted oil
companies. One notable example took place in 1998 in the Ogbia LGA in Bayelsa state when
representatives  from youth  organisations,  Councils  of  Chiefs  and  Elders,  Community
Development Committees (CDCs) and a disparate group of young men and women, many
of whom were university undergraduates,  from three villages (Imiringi,  Otuasega and
Elebele) known as “Kolo Creek”, collectively organised a “general strike”. This involved
the occupation of the Shell flow station in Imiringi during which all Shell personnel were
ordered to leave the premises peacefully, the disconnection of the manifold controlling
the conduit of petroleum from all the oil pipelines in the area, and the forced disruption
of production from the Kolo Creek area for one week. The action was in protest against
the lack of  social  investment by the oil  company,  Shell,  locally known as SPDC (Shell
Petroleum Development Company), which since 1971, as the operating partner in one of
many joint venture oil and gas production projects in Nigeria, had been extracting light
crude oil from wells in each of the villages in Kolo Creek. The events of October 1998
marked a turning point in relations between Shell and the people of Kolo Creek, who had
for  many  years  appealed  to  Shell  for  greater  levels  of  investment  in  development
projects, greater opportunities for employment and the awarding of contracts to local
people, but to little or no avail. The results of the “general strike” were largely successful,
inducing Shell to improve social provisions at least for those in the immediate Kolo Creek
area.  The  events  of  1998-1999  also  cemented  a  new  composite  Kolo  Creek  political
identity as distinct from that of the rest of Ogbia.
5 The Ijaw nationalists who formed the IYC wanted to create a popular mass movement out
of disparate episodes of “uprising” like the Kolo Creek general strike and to unite the
culturally diverse groups that make up the Ijaw people under a single ethnic umbrella.
Contemporary Ijaw nationalist narratives claim that an Ijaw ethnic nationality existed in
an historical and cultural sense long before the discovery of oil. They describe the Ijaw as
40 clans comprising of 500 “communities” or “sub-groups” 5 with some seven distinct and
mutually  unintelligible  languages  between  them  (Williamson  1968),  scattered  across
extensive geographical distances, extending from Ondo state in the west of Nigeria to
Akwa Ibom state in the east  of  the country.  These narratives  hold that  the political
marginalisation of the Ijaw as an ethnic minority group since the 1950s has prevented
them from benefiting fully from the oil resources that sustain the Nigerian nation. It has
also prevented them from addressing the environmental and ecological problems caused
by over 40 years of oil production and exploration activity in the Niger Delta. So although
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oil,  they argue, has not created the Ijaw nation, the struggle for ownership and more
effective control  of  the revenues accruing from oil,  has served to galvanise disparate
members of the Ijaw ethnic community around a common plight 6. Politically the aim of
Ijaw nationalists is to use their strategic location in the oil-producing areas as leverage
with which to push for a more effective voice for the Ijaw, deemed to constitute a political
minority within the Nigerian polity.
6 The  article  examines  the  background  to  the  general  strike  and  its  aftermath,  and,
through it,  explores  competing  and  often  violent  attempts  to  redefine  ethnic  group
membership  in  an  “Ijaw”  oil-producing  community  in  the  Niger  Delta.  It  draws  its
observations  from  research  carried  out  in 2002  on  the  responses  of  three  “host
communities”  to  oil  companies  in  Ogbia  LGA,  which  according  to  Nigeria’s  ethnic
nomenclature  are  classified as  Ijaw.  It  assesses  the  extent  to  which the narrative  of
“uprising and struggle” so frequently expressed in the public rhetoric of Ijaw nationalists
in the IYC and INC 7, and replicated in academic writings about the Delta (Naanen 1995;
Osaghae  1995;  Obi  1999)  is  borne  out  by  events  that  took  place  in  oil-producing
communities in Bayelsa state in the 1990s. It examines whether the “restiveness” in the
Niger Delta—the occupations of oil company facilities, the confiscation of oil company
assets and kidnapping of personnel, the cases of armed confrontation with federal and
state security forces—reflects the appropriation by Ijaw communities living at the site of
oil production and exploration activities of new pan-Ijaw nationalist discourses to which
“resource control” and the creation of Ijaw ethnically homogeneous states are central.
7 Ijaw nationalists within the IYC and INC have been keen to use the “restiveness” of the
Niger Delta amongst groups they have defined as belonging to the Ijaw ethnic group to
bolster  their  demands  for  resource  control,  the  creation  of  more  states  within  the
Nigerian Federation and the greater inclusion and political recognition of the Ijaw within
the Nigerian polity, who they claim constitute Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group 8. Yet,
at the micro level, in villages and in the LGAs of Bayelsa state, it is not at all clear that the
conflicts between oil-producing communities and oil companies are being articulated on
a pan-Ijaw nationalist platform. In many ways the politics of oil and competition at an
intra- and inter-village level have fragmented local identities and engendered a degree of
detachment  from  a  pan-Ijaw  nationalist  identity.  The  proliferation  of  pan-ethnic
nationalist movements in Nigeria and particularly in the Niger Delta over more than a
decade suggests that a certain degree of pan-ethnic cohesion or consensus exists amongst
members of the ethnic group concerned. However, micro-level studies demonstrate that
the question of ethnic belonging is an altogether more complex, widely contested and as
yet  unsettled  one,  in  which  the  interests  of  different  generations  and  social  classes
collide 9.
8 The article is divided into five sections. The first provides a retrospective look at some of
the conceptual perspectives on ethnicity that have influenced the manner in which Ijaw
ethnicity is  treated in the article.  The second explores relationships between oil  and
ethnic politics historically within Nigeria as the background against which this particular
episode in Ogbia’s  history is  situated.  The third presents Ogbia LGA and explores the
history of identity-based cleavages within Ogbia and the place of Ijaw nationalism and oil
production in Ogbia’s history. Oloibiri, where oil production first began in Nigeria in 1956,
is situated in the Ogbia LGA. It examines how the shift in production from Oloibiri to Kolo
Creek impacted upon the political identity of Ogbia more generally and on the appeal of
Ijaw  nationalism  in  particular.  Recent  events  are  situated  within  a  longue  durée
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perspective,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  points  of  convergence  between,  and
rupture with, the ideas and activities of Ijaw nationalists in Ogbia in the past and present.
The fourth section provides a description of the “general strike” which took place in
1998, likened here to the “uprising” of Ijaw nationalist public rhetoric, tracing its origins,
its main protagonists and its outcomes. It also explores the role of the oil company SPDC
(Shell)  in  redefining  notions  of  community  and  community  representation,  and  in
transforming and emboldening the power of formerly insignificant social and political
institutions,  like  the  Community  Development  Committee  (CDC)  which  became  its
principal interlocutor in oil-related matters. The fifth and most important section looks
at the outcome of the “uprising” through an examination of the transformation of Kolo
Creek identities.
Ethnicity—A Retrospective Glance
9 The unravelling of Ijaw ethnicity in Ogbia underlines the non-static, dynamic nature of
ethnicity  more  generally.  Our  approach  draws  heavily  on  situationalist  perspectives
which have emphasised understanding how particular situations (external events and
processes) shape ethnic identities, which they see as contingent and closely dependent on
the  contexts  within  which  they  emerge  (Laitin  1986).  It  is  also  influenced  by
“instrumentalist” approaches which emphasise the role of political calculation (Melson &
Wolpe 1971; Glazer & Moynihan 1975). Although purely instrumentalist perspectives at
one  end  of  the  anti-primordialist  spectrum have  often  come  under  stringent  attack
(Williams  1991)  for  overstating  the  argument  in  favour  of political  calculation,  they
provide a useful starting point for making the claim that ethnic forms of mobilisation are
intelligible  political  phenomena,  rather  than  simply  the  outpouring  of  unrestrained
human emotion. Our approach also benefits from the work of Benedict Anderson (1983),
whose concept of “imagined communities” has tried to combine several strands in the
anti-primordialist  vein.  Anderson  goes beyond  simply  stating  that  identities  were
constructed and explaining why, to ask questions about how and by whom. Equally the
work of historians like John Lonsdale (1993), whose study of the emergence of Kikuyu
identities in Kenya has shown how the translation of the Bible into local languages by
Protestant missionaries enabled people to imagine the existence of an “ethnic public”, a
community of brothers and sisters who shared the same language, has provided food for
thought in the Ijaw case as they were amongst the first groups of the Delta to have their
language used in bible translations in the late 19th century. Lonsdale’s work is particularly
helpful as he also proposes one way out of the quagmire of how to go beyond the purely
instrumental and political interpretations of ethnicity. He suggests that ethnicity is made
up of two worlds: one in which the meaning of concepts such as community and moral
worth is struggled over, which he calls “moral ethnicity”, and another, which he calls
“political tribalism”, in which members of different ethnic groups compete for political
advantage. This binary distinction he draws between the “moral” and “political” spheres,
builds on an idea originally advanced by Peter Ekeh (1975) of “two publics”: the ethnic
public in which reciprocity and obligation are important and the immoral civic public of
the post colonial state, in which anything goes.
10 Exploring  the  contending  visions  of  moral  worth  within  the  “ethnic  community”  is
critical to our enquiry. The generation, social class and clan-based conflicts amongst the
Ijaw suggest the need to identify which interests are represented at each moment of
“ethnic resurgence”. This does not mean that this moral sphere should be conceived of as
analytically separate from the public  sphere in which inter-ethnic “encounters” take
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place.  In spite of the idiom of “natural ties” within which ethnic identities are often
packaged, the state itself plays a critical role in setting the parameters around which
people forge such “ties”. Peter Geschiere (1996) observes quite rightly that it is impossible
to separate the two worlds. Exploring the interaction between the state and the internal
debates within the ethnic public is central to our approach, which recognises the utility
of the “two publics” paradigm but seeks to go beyond it, to tease out how the agents of
the ethnic public and the state interact.
11 Rather than exploring Ijaw ethnicity as an anthropological phenomenon, it is argued that
ethnic mobilisation—what we refer to here as  “ethnic nationalism”—is an intelligible
political  phenomenon,  rooted  in  the  history,  current  character  and  organisation  of
political competition within the Nigerian state. The Ijaw ethnicities with which we are
concerned  are  not  simply  the  stuff  of  time-immemorial  solidarities  rooted  in  a
“traditional” sphere, but the product of socially constructed identities which have arisen
as  a  result  of  the  profound  social,  economic  and  political  changes  that  Nigeria  has
undergone, from colonisation to oil-induced post-colonial transformation.
12 We emphasise the need to understand ethnicity as a language of politics rather than as
antithetical  to  the  political  project  and the  importance  of  moving beyond unhelpful
preoccupations about the extent to which ethnicity is invented or real. We also recognise
the usefulness of approaches which emphasise contingency and construction, but not
simply as a way of dismissing the relevance of ethnic identity. Rather, it is argued that
only through identifying who the protagonists are, the motivation behind their ethnic
projects, the means they use to communicate their message and the circumstances in
which their “followers” come to appropriate or reject ethnic discourses, can we map out
the contours of the political landscape in Nigeria and understand the salience of ethnicity
therein.
Oil, Ethnicity and the Nigerian State
13 Any attempt to explore the relationship between oil and the rise in ethnic consciousness
in Nigeria would be incomplete without an appreciation of the central role which the
Nigerian state plays in determining the contours of ethnic mobilization and mediating,
albeit rarely independently, between competing ethnic aspirations of different groups.
The metaphor of ethnicity as governmentality, both of the state and the oil multinationals
which have come to constitute a state of sorts in the “host communities” within which
they operate, is used throughout the article. It emphasises the centrality of the state and
the oil companies in ordering a hierarchy of preferences which make ethnic belonging,
both at micro and macro levels, a relevant social and political cleavage.
14 Successive oil booms since the early 1970s and the fiscal centralisation of Nigeria’s oil
revenues since the civil war (1967-1970) by the federal government, have increased the
power of the latter relative to once semi-autonomous units of the Federation. These were
known as regional governments prior to the reforms of 1967 and state governments, ever
since. By 1966, oil revenues accounted for 32% of export earnings. At the end of the civil
war in 1970, oil revenues rose to 80% of total federal revenues and 90% of export earnings
by 1974.  In 1974 with the international  oil  price rises,  oil  revenues rose by 3.5 times
(Forrest 1995). Although oil was not the cause of the war, fears that an independent state
of Biafra would control up to 60% of Nigeria’s total oil revenues galvanised the Nigerian
federal government to take decisive action in crushing it (Othman & Williams 1999).
15 Oil transformed Nigeria into a non-productive “rentier” state where income is derived
mainly from foreign sources and not local taxation. As Guyer (1994) has argued, any type
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of  restraint  that  payers  of  income  tax  and  indirect  taxes  could  have  imposed  on
government spending have been minimised. Instead oil resources, which since the 1969
Petroleum  Act  have  been  wholly  “owned”  by  the  state,  have  become  “national
property”—referred  to  as  the  “national  cake”,  a  piece  of  which  is  seen  as  the
quintessential right of all Nigerians.
16 The  oil  boom of  the  early  1970s  and  the  political  and  fiscal  centralisation  which  it
encouraged,  also  dramatically  increased  the  capacity  of  the  state  to  distribute  its
patronage. The influx of oil revenues alone did not create this logic. Tom Forrest’s (1995)
characterisation of the Nigerian state as a patronage-based set of relations which predate
oil,  but  have  become  entrenched  and  consolidated  by  it,  provides  a  useful  way  of
explaining  the  linkage  between  oil,  ethnicity  and  state  in  Nigeria.  He  traces  the
emergence of patronage as governance, to the regionalisation in 1954 of the commodity
marketing boards after which regional governments inherited a trading surplus of up to
£87 million. This allowed them to use the funds to enhance the capacity of the party in
power to recruit influential members, reward loyalty and deny patronage to those who
did  not  support  it.  Some  investments  were  also  made  in  social  infrastructure;  for
example, in 1960, southern regional governments were spending up to 40% of recurrent
expenditure on education with the Western regional government funding free universal
primary education.
17 The 1954 constitution also created a new type of fiscal autonomy in the regions, reversing
earlier legislation (1951) and recommending, in line with the recommendations of the
Chick Fiscal Commission, that 50% of all the net proceeds from agricultural exports and
100% of all mining rents and royalties be retained in the region whence they originated
(Ezera  1960).  Although  the  western  cocoa-producing  region,  initially  benefited  most
because  cocoa  was  Nigeria’s  main  export-earner  at  the  time,  the  legislation  was
eventually to have important consequences for the East, which initially lost out because
palm products upon which it relied were not huge export earners, but which, after the
discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1956, stood to be the richest region by far.
18 Although the regionalisation of the marketing boards was instrumental  in promoting
patronage as a political way of life in Nigeria, the emergence of the Nigerian state itself
right from its colonial inception, would be a more useful place to start. The colonial state
was  an  essentially  authoritarian  state,  which  for  much of  its  life  was  committed  to
extraction  rather  than  to  developmental  or  welfare  goals  (Mamdani  1996).  Colonial
subjects were generally forced to pay the cost of infrastructural developments aimed at
facilitating the transportation of agricultural commodities and minerals like tin and coal
from hinterland to coast. It was in this context that people were forced to use personal
connections to gain access to state resources which were not readily available to all.
19 The Indirect Rule system was created to serve the extractive imperative by grafting a
semblance of order on a heterogeneous array of colonial subjects. It created a language of
clans, tribes and sub-tribes which provided the ideational template from which kinship
relations could be mobilised and acted upon. The Ijaw emerged during the colonial period
as just one such tribe and became a politically conscious “minority” because of their small
numbers. This happened in the wake of decolonization processes of the 1940s and 1950s
when political power was conferred primarily on those pan-ethnic groups, best able to
mobilise the largest numbers in the constituent regions of the Federation. These were the
Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba mainly in the West and the Igbo mainly in the East.
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20 The creation of twelve states to replace the regions, by Head of State Lt. Col. Gowon in
May 1967, upon the advice of powerful senior government civil servants, mainly from
minority areas immediately prior to the announcement of secession, was intended to to
break up the divisive three-pronged region-based ethnic politics which had so plagued
the First Republic and to introduce a more rational distribution of oil revenues between
the different states of  the Federation.  The reforms were also motivated by the more
urgent need to foil the secessionist attempt, by undermining eastern minority support for
the  Biafran  secessionist  cause  and  by  granting  the  states  for  which  they  had  been
campaigning for more than a decade. Although the first round of state creation did, in the
short term, break up the power of the regions, it did not break up for good the majority
pan-ethnic power blocs that had been dominant within them. These, over time, simply
reconstituted themselves to take advantage of the new trend towards state creation. In
the light of the federal government’s centralisation of oil revenues, they became a means
of  ensuring  greater  access  to  a  share  of  the  “national  cake”.  In  the  absence  of  any
widespread attachment to the nation-state and any commitment on the part of successive
governments to re-distribution (Ake 1999) in the form of welfare and social provision,
“distribution” in the form of patronage, continues to be a model for a governance, the
principal objective of which remains an extractive one. The existence of Nigeria’s large
population (officially estimated at 127 million in 2003) 10, religious and linguistic diversity
(Agheyisi  1984) 11,  and  the  legacy  of  a  highly  centrifugal  state  model,  has  further
exacerbated this tendency.
21 This  distributive  logic  has  engendered  new  forms  of  identity-based  politics  which
encourages rent-seeking entrepreneurs to manufacture “difference” or  ethnicity as  a
means of securing the creation of new political units (states or LGAs) created which can
guarantee them a greater share of federal grants from oil revenues than would otherwise
be the case (Bach 1997). Ethnicity itself is constantly being re-defined, shifting from a
static historical notion more akin to tribe, to one which emphasises membership of a
given state of local government of origin. In a political system in which patron-client
relationships prevail as the principle channel through which “citizens” gain access to the
state and its resources,  ethnicity matters.  By increasing the distributive scope of  the
state, oil has served to entrench ethnicity as a set of effective codes through which to
secure access to networks of patronage.
22 Local government creation in particular, which from 1979 onwards has increasingly been
directly funded from the federal purse, has encouraged the mobilisation of “sub-ethnic”
or micro identities. These correspond in the main to the “clan” divisions that were part of
the administrative map of the Indirect Rule system introduced during the colonial period.
By holding out the promise of rewards to “communities” best able to demonstrate their
distinctiveness, the oil industry operating at the level of “host communities”, has also
helped to fragment and mobilise identities at a “sub-ethnic” level.
23 The consolidation of  the principle of  indigeneity in Nigeria’s  constitutions from 1979
onwards, as a criterion of citizenship, whereby rights to public goods (educational grants,
healthcare, employment opportunities in the public and often private sector, and the
ability to stand for electoral office, eligibility to represent the state or local government
at  federal  level  or  state  levels)  are  conferred  depending  on  where  one’s  parents  or
grandparents are from, has heightened the intensity and popularity of ethnic discourses
(Bach 1997).
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24 Restrictions on party-political activity and nationwide independent political organisation
during the 1980s under the military regimes of President Ibrahim Babangida and later
under  General  Sani  Abacha  in  the  1990s,  encouraged  political  forms  of  resistance
throughout Nigeria which adopted militant ethnic forms. The annulment of the results of
the presidential elections on 12 June 1993, which were supposed to have installed a new
civilian  regime,  and  a  popularly  elected  president  (Moshood  Abiola),  created  a  new
episode  in  the  intensification  of  militant  ethnic  politics  (Jega  2000).  Although  the
annulment  of  the  elections  initially  received  widespread  condemnation  across  the
country, irrespective of region, ethnicity and religion, protests were particularly intense
in the south-west of the country, where the annulment came to be perceived as an affront
to the Yoruba who had been denied their  “right  to occupy presidential  office”.  This
perception was manipulated by the interim government and military regime of General
Sani Abacha, in order to undermine the countrywide protests and discredit any criticism
of the June 12th annulment as a Yoruba affair (Othman & Williams 1999).
Ijaw and the Politics of Oil in Rivers State
25 In the main oil-producing state, Rivers state (prior to 1996 when it was split into two), a
rich and powerful political and business elite emerged to take advantage of the revenues
derived from oil rents and royalties, 20% of which were shared between oil-producing
states alone, up until 1981. The power elite in Rivers was composed mainly of members of
the largest ethnic group in the state, the Ijaw. As elsewhere in the country, although the
direct clients of this group may have seen some of the benefits from oil, the majority of
the population, whether Ijaw or not, did not.
26 Instead,  the capital-intensive and historically  badly regulated oil-production industry
itself  disrupted  and  sometimes  destroyed  the  traditional  livelihood  base  of  the
inhabitants of oil-producing regions who are mainly farmers and fishermen, whilst giving
the vast majority of them little in return by way of qualitative improvements in their
lives. Throughout the Niger Delta, where most of Nigeria’s onshore resources are located,
huge and highly visible social and economic disparities continue to exist between those
linked  to  the  oil  industry,  either  through  employment  within  it  or  as  public  office
holders, who enjoy access to modern conveniences associated with a high-tech industry
and those obliged to live in poverty in “host” communities, who drink from often oil-
polluted river water in which they fish, wash and also often defecate. Okorobia (2001)
describes  a  process  of  the  “proletarianisation”  of  population  of  the  Niger  Delta,
particularly those engaged in the traditional fishing economy of the Eastern Niger Delta.
This results from the multiple disruptions caused by the oil industry and the inability and
unwillingness of what is essentially a capital-intensive, although not labour-intensive,
industry to absorb a largely unskilled population. This in turn has created rising levels of
unemployment and poverty in the Delta. The inability of the state, from the early 1980s
onwards and particularly after the introduction of structural adjustment policies in 1988,
to provide basic services, and the inability of increasingly impoverished communities to
pay  for  them,  exacerbated  the  situation.  Throughout  the  1970s  and  1980s  isolated
incidents of protests against the manner in which oil companies conducted their business
became widespread throughout the Niger Delta.
27 Up until 1981, the existence of the “derivation principle” which allowed oil-producing
states to retain a significant proportion of locally derived revenues within the state itself,
as a pillar upon which fiscal relations between the central government and states were
organiszed, enabled oil-rich state governments to enjoy the benefits of their fortuitous
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situation. Between 1966 and 1979 the revenue allocation formula was altered six times
(1966/1967, 1968/1969, 1969/1970, 1971/1972, 1975/1976 and 1979) (Othman & Williams
1999:  28).  Throughout  the  1970s  the  bulk  of  oil  revenues  retained  by  the  federal
government  increased  substantially,  whilst  the  revenues  retained  in  the  states  from
which they derived declined. Whereas during the First Republic,  federal and regional
expenditures  were  equal,  in  1975-1976 federal  expenditure  increased to  70% of  total
expenditure. By the 1980s, during the civilian government of 1979-1983, public pressure
and  the  clamour  for  an  increase  in  the  states’  share  of  oil  revenues,  forced  the
government to reduce the federal government’s share to 55% of oil revenues.
28 The demise of the derivation principle in favour of the growth of a distributable pool
account which was divided between three tiers of government and distributed to the
states  on the basis  of  population size and need as  opposed to derivation,  worked to
disadvantage  the  oil-producing  states.  It  also  created  a  nationwide  political  schism
between oil-producing and non oil-producing states, which most sharply played itself out
in 2001/2002 during the “offshore/onshore” saga, provoked by the decision by the newly
instituted  civilian  presidency  of  Olusegun  Obasanjo,  to  seek  clarification  from  the
Supreme Court over whether revenues from offshore oil resources should be considered
along with onshore-derived revenues, when calculating the derivation-based revenues
(increased to 13% under Obasanjo) to be credited to the oil-producing state governments.
The Supreme Court ruled in the federal government’s favour, provoking outrage in the
oil-producing states, particularly from Cross River state which was initially required to
pay back funds already received by the federal government.
29 The frustrations that the loss of derivation aroused amongst members of the Ijaw political
class encouraged the emergence of new alliances with discontented groups, which had
emerged in the wake of structural economic reforms introduced in the late 1980s (Obi
1998). By the late 1980s, the consequences of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
were felt throughout the Niger Delta as elsewhere in the Federation, particularly in the
rising levels of unemployment amongst university graduates and rising levels of student
poverty. Many of those who had been involved in politically opposing SAP through the
National  Union  of  Students  (NANS)  after  it  became  subject  to  political  infiltration,
returned “home” to seek relevance through ethnic associations.  Isaac Osuoka, former
spokesperson of the IYC,  was one such former NANS activist 12.  There they found rural
people, more destitute than themselves, particularly in the context of adjustment, and
particularly ripe for mobilisation.
30 The existence  of  cohorts  of  unemployed university-educated men and women and a
frustrated class of  disgruntled elites,  who since between 1981 and 1999 had seen the
derivation formula upon which they had relied for privileged access to oil rents virtually
disappear, created articulate agents capable of transforming what had previously been
isolated  protests  against  oil  company irresponsibility  into  a  systematically  organised
challenge to the Nigerian state and oil multinationals. In the context of economic crisis
and state shrinkage, more radical strains of ethnic consciousness, which I refer to here as
“ethnic nationalism”, emerged amongst the Ijaw.
31 Because  of  their  place  within  popular  accounts  of  Nigeria’s  political  history  as  a
“minority”  excluded  from  power  by  the  “majorities”,  the  Ijaw  are  equipped  with  a
collective “memory” of a “long history of marginalisation” as a minority group. Being
from the “Niger Delta” they are also able to enjoy the political purchase that comes with
the Niger Delta name tag, made famous as a site of struggle by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa
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and his Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), whose battle against the
oil major Shell imprinted the Niger Delta on the Nigerian and international popular
consciousness. The Ijaw nationalist struggle, which broke out in the wake of the Ogoni
struggle and saw the proliferation of ethnic nationality organisations, each with their
own “bill of rights” of sorts, is often presumed to have emerged from precisely the same
set of historical and political circumstances as that of the Ogoni. Ike Okonta (2002) once
described the Ogoni movement MOSOP as a “civic communal” movement which is led by
Ogoni  elites  who for  decades  have  found themselves  hovering on the  fringes  of  the
national political class, elbowed out by larger minority and majority groups alike. MOSOP’s
strength lay in its ability to galvanise men and women throughout Ogoni who support the
political  quests of  their leaders,  whom they view as true patriots,  whose victory will
enable them to become true citizens, and get more out of a truly democratic Nigerian
state.
32 Unlike the Ogoni, whose avenues to state power during the Babangida years were highly
circumscribed,  many  members  of  the  Ijaw  political  class  were  able  to  ensure  their
continued access to political power. During the most repressive episodes of military rule,
prior to and after the structural adjustment reforms of the late 1980s, Ijaw elites were
among the few minority elites to be successfully “incorporated” into the institutional
apparatus of the state, at the level of the Rivers state bureaucracy and at a federal level
within the armed forces (mainly the Navy), within the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)
and as well-paid civilian advisors to the military regime. For this reason and because most
of the Rivers state governors indigenous to the state have been Ijaw, they are resented
amongst many smaller minority groups in the Niger Delta who consider them to have
been unduly “favoured”.
33 The Ijaw political class throughout the Babangida period, like other groups throughout
Nigeria and particularly in the Niger Delta, had to contend with the threat posed by rising
numbers of unemployed Ijaw men and women, leaving universities with no prospect of
employment and who joined forces with the masses of  unemployed and increasingly
frustrated men and women at home, suffering the disruptive social, environmental and
economic  impact  of  the  oil  industry  in  their  backyards.  Their  embrace  of  an  Ijaw
nationalist discourse through their creation of an Ijaw nationalist organisation, the Ijaw
National Congress, in 1991, was in part an attempt to seek relevance in the face of an
increasingly  threatening class  of  dispossessed and at  the  same time to  vie  for  more
political units (states and LGAs) and a revision of the revenue-sharing formula in favour of
“derivation”. This was in line with the traditional motivations of Ijaw political elites and
other ethnic entrepreneurs in Nigeria.
34 Mustapha and Osaghae have rightly argued that the Ijaw, like other minority groups,
have shirked off the “minority” paraphernalia in order to present themselves as “ethnic
nationalities”  in  their  own right,  able  and willing to  re-negotiate  the terms of  their
inclusion within the Nigerian state. It is worth noting that Ijaw nationalism, articulated as
a call for the recognition of rights as an “ethnic nationality”—“no longer as a minority”—
and as the “fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria”, and as a call for a sovereign national
conference, is being spearheaded by two distinct political constituencies. It is significant
that  two principle  umbrella  organisations,  and not  one as  in  the  case  of  the  Ogoni,
emerged to take forward the struggle: the Ijaw National Congress and the Movement for
the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND) which eventually became absorbed
within  the  Ijaw Youth  Council  (IYC).  Although  linked,  MOSIEND/IYC and  the  INC have
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distinct social origins: the latter is an organisation bringing together past, present and
would-be political heavyweights, whilst the former at its outset, represented those who
challenge the manner in which members of the Ijaw political class to date, have behaved.
 
Kolo Creek
Source: SPDC.
Identity-Based Cleavages in Ogbia—An Historical Perspective
35 Ogbia is situated in a fresh-water inland site in the south-eastern part of Bayelsa state
(see map, p. 471), to the North of Nembe, and to the north of which lies a large expanse of
forest. Prior to the building of the Ogbia-Yenagoa road, this forest separated Ogbia from
much  of  the  northern  and  central  parts  of  the  Delta.  Under  the  Eastern  Regional
Government after 1955, Ogbia became a County Council of Brass Division, and acquired its
own first-class chieftaincy stool under the newly established Eastern Regional House of
Chiefs and Traditional Rulers. It was only in 1991, after another federally inspired state-
creation exercise, that Ogbia became a separate LGA, one of eight in Bayelsa state.
36 Ogbia is home to speakers in three language groups which linguistically are classified as
Edo, i.e. more akin to the languages of Benin than any of those within the Ijo cluster.
Ogbia has nevertheless produced an important batch of nationally renowned political
leaders who have championed an Ijaw nationalist cause. Melford Okilo, from Amakalakala
in Ogbia,  became MP for Brass South in the National Assembly under the Niger Delta
Congress party banner during the First Republic and later the first civilian governor of
Rivers  state  (1979-1983)  and senator  for  Brass  Senatorial  District  (1999-2003).  Oronto
Nantie Douglas, human rights lawyer and founding member of the Ijaw Youth Council
along with a number of Niger Delta-wide civil society organisations, is also from Ogbia.
The political relevance of Ogbia sons may not be unrelated to the fact that Ogbia is also
home to Oloibiri, where oil in commercial quantities was first struck in 1956. Although
Oloibiri’s oil  wells have since dried up, oil  production activity continues in the “Kolo
creek” area of Ogbia.
Emergent Ogbia and Ijaw Identities
37 The trans-Atlantic slave trade and subsequently the palm-oil trade which developed first
with  the  eastern  Ijaw city  state  traders  playing  a  prominent  role  as  intermediaries
between  European  merchants  and  palm  cutters,  created  the  context  within  which
residents of today’s Ogbia LGA established contacts with each other and with “others”
throughout the Niger Delta and beyond. Prior to the slave trade and during the Atlantic
slave trade, they supplied the neighbouring slave-trading city state of Brass (today known
as Nembe) with food products in exchange for salt-water fish. The slave trade created
some  opportunities  for  those  geographically  close  to  Brass  (Nembe)  to  establish
themselves as agents, whilst the palm product trade saw the expansion of production and
processing of palm products beyond domestic consumption throughout Ogbia. Although
the economic and social  transformations occasioned by the development of the palm
product trade affected communities along the three creeks in Ogbia, the establishment of
the colonial administrative apparatus and the development of missionary culture tended
to benefit communities which were culturally and geographically closer to Brass (Nembe),
notably descendants of the Olei/Oloi group in and around Oloibiri creek (Amakalakala,
Okoroba/Okoroma) and not Kolo and Anyama.
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38 There are a number of conflicting accounts of the origins of the people of Ogbia, a diverse
mixture  of  Edo-speaking  peoples  whose  languages  are  broadly  mutually  intelligible,
although dissimilar.  On  the  one  side  are  those  who claim that  Ogbia  emerged  after
multiple migrations by communities into the area from the 15th century onwards, each of
which established distinct groups of settlements. One such settlement was established by
descendants  of  a  person known by the  name of  Igbeyan who came from Benin and
founded five distinct groups of settlements 13. The opposing view denies the existence of
any such eponymous ancestor and by extension the existence of an Ogbia (a derivative of
Igbeyan) people per se. Instead, they refer to descendents of Olei, the founder of Oloibiri,
whose descendants migrated from Benin,  founded Nembe and moved on to establish
Oloibiri, and whose vassals established settlements throughout what is today considered
as Ogbia, killing off any other groups they encountered. The Oloibiri group, with close
connections  to  Nembe,  argues  that  the  name  Ogbia  is  in  fact  a  1940s intellectual
modification  of  Ogbeyan, the  detrimental  term used  by  the  Nembe  to  describe  their
neighbours across the water: “those people who throw sticks and stones and are always
fighting” 14.  The  early  contact  between  Nembe,  European  traders  and  later  colonial
administrators,  and  the  use  of  Nembe  versions  of  events  in  colonial  texts  and
administrative  pracinto  the  area  from  the  15th century  onwards,  each  of  which
established particularly outside Ogbia.
39 The first Ogbia warrant or court chief was from Oloibiri. Chief Apata, who was the father
of G. I. Amangala and other compound chiefs from Oloibiri itself, took it in turns to be
represented at the Native Court 15. Church Mission Society (CMS) mission culture, and the
pervasive influence of Nembe speakers within it, also did little to endear many Ogbia
residents outside the Oloibiri axis to CMS Christianity, which was widely associated with
Nembe expansionism.
A History of Ijaw Nationalism in Ogbia
40 Ogbia is undeniably inhabited by people of diverse origins, whether or not they were
there subsequent to or prior to the arrival of the descendants of Olei. The fierceness of
the debates over the history does not stem simply from the desire of lay historians to split
hairs  over  details  about  the  past,  but  from  the  importance  of  “historical  facts”  in
determining how patronage and the material and social opportunities emanating from it
are shared between those who can lay claim to longevity of stay or status ascendancy.
Promoters of the Oloibiri-centred version of events have a heavy stake in ensuring that
Oloibiri enjoys continued headship status over the rest of Ogbia. In 1955, a first-class
stool,  known  as  the  Ogbanobhan  of  Ogbia,  was  created  by  the  Eastern  Regional
Government within the newly created Eastern Regional Council of Chiefs and Traditional
Rulers.  Rev G. I. Amangala,  a  native of  Oloibiri  and author of  the first  “Ijaw history”
written by an “Ijaw” entitled A Short  History  of  the  Ijaw (Amangala 1939)  became the
Ogbanabhan. This was after years of campaigning for the creation of such a paramount
ruler  position  for  the  whole  of  Ogbia  and  a  single  Native  Court  through  the  Ogbia
Brotherhood, the socio-cultural/political  organisation he founded in the 1940s and to
which all Ogbia sons ostensibly belong.
41 Amangala’s  aspirations  were  for  an  Ogbia-centred  political  identity,  rather  than  an
exclusively Oloibiri  one,  which could fit  into a broader pan-Ijaw identity.  His Oloibiri
origins,  however,  meant  that  his  project,  irrespective  of  its  pan-Ogbia  and  pan-Ijaw
leanings, bore the hallmarks of an Oloibiri-centred political project. Amangala himself
played a formidable role in claiming an Ijaw identity for the Ogbia, whilst at the same
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time forging an Ogbia identity itself. Prior to this, there had been very little of a cohesive
Ogbia identity to speak of. Amangala’s dual enterprise—creating a strong Ijaw identity
rooted in  a  strong Ogbia  identity—resonates  with  the  enterprise  of  today’s  pan-Ijaw
nationalist  umbrella  organisations,  the  Ijaw  Youth  Council  (IYC)  and  Ijaw  National
Congress  (INC),  for  whom forging  a  strong  Ijaw political  identity  is  predicated  upon
forging strong “clan” identities.
The Politics of Oil and Oloibiri
42 In 1956, some four years before political independence was officially granted to Nigeria,
petroleum “in commercial quantities” was discovered in the town of Otuogidi, in Oloibiri
division.  The creation of the position of Ogbanobhan as a first-class chieftaincy stool
recognised  by  the  National  Council  of  Nigerian  Citizens  (NCNC)-led  Eastern  Regional
Government, the discovery of petroleum in the same year and the increasing political
power of the Ogbia Brotherhood both inside and outside Ogbia, all concentrated around
the Oloibiri  axis,  compounded already existing fissures  within Ogbia.  Support  for,  or
antagonism to, the NCNC was a major fault line throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Although
the existence of  NCNC party stalwarts turned some villages pro- NCNC,  the majority of
Ogbia, particularly outside the Oloibiri axis, was anti-NCNC. The emergence of an Ogbia
son, Melford Okilo, as the Niger Delta Congress party candidate and later as MP for Brass
district in 1959, provided a figure around which the anti-Igbo/anti-NCNC camp in Ogbia
could rally. Okilo was from Amakalakala, a village not too far from Oloibiri, but which
subsequently became a bastion of opposition to Oloibiri’s dominance. The reprisals from
which Ogbia as  a  whole suffered after  Okilo’s  electoral  victory,  in terms of  losses  of
patronage and the denial of access to Eastern Regional Government funds, as the ruling
NCNC party sought to recover its lost seat, set the stage for the realignment of political
forces during the Biafran War (1967-1970), which also saw villages divided along pro-
Biafra and anti-Biafra lines, with former NCNC supporters falling within the pro-Biafra
camp. The reprisals against Biafra supporters after the war throughout the 1970s,  as
elsewhere in the Delta, were severe in Ogbia where village-level extra-judicial killings
took place.
43 In 1967, Alfred Diete Spiff, a native of Twon Brass and Nembe, was appointed military
governor of the newly created Rivers state, a post which he held until 1975. This meant
that the pro-Nembe Oloibiri axis within Ogbia, continued to be the recipients of state
patronage at a time when petroleum receipts from Oloibiri were increasing and when the
derivation formula was sufficiently high to work in favour of the oil-producing states. In
1971, 45% of onshore oil rents and royalties were retained in the states where they came
from. Rivers state at the time received 17.1% of all oil revenues whilst Bendel received
23.7% (Forrest 1995). By the time civilian rule had returned and Melford Okilo was elected
governor of Rivers state in 1979, the derivation payments to oil-producing states had
significantly declined. Reforms introduced in 1975 ensured that the derivation principle
applied to only 20% of all oil revenues (Forrest 1995; Naanen 1995). From 1976 onwards
“derivation”  was  replaced  by  full  fiscal  centralisation.  In  1981,  a  special  fund  was
established replacing derivation, which gave oil-producing states the equivalent of 2% of
the share of federally collected funds allocated to all states of the Federation. This was to
be divided between them on the basis of derivation (Oyovbaire 1985). With this reduction
in the disposable income of Rivers state, Ogbia saw a dramatic shift in political power
away  from  the  Oloibiri  axis.  Melford  Okilo,  through  his  support  for  infrastructural
projects in Ogbia, deliberately sited outside Oloibiri, the most notable of which was the
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creation of Ogbia town itself,  further served to consolidate Oloibiri’s decline. In 1971,
petroleum was discovered in other parts of Ogbia, notably in what became known as the
Kolo Creek area, which fell within the former Kolo/Emeyal Native Court and clan area.
Petroleum was also discovered in parts of Anyama, the site of one of the former Anyama
Native Court Areas. These oil finds dented the power that Oloibiri had once enjoyed.
Uprisings in Kolo CreekA Background to Shell in Kolo Creek
44 Since 1971, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), the operating partner in
one of many joint-venture oil and gas production projects in Nigeria, has been extracting
light crude oil from wells in three villages in Ogbia 16:  Elebele, Imiringi and Otuasega,
known in Shell-speak as “Kolo Creek” or Area A of SPDC’s Eastern Division. Imiringi is the
site  of  twelve oil  wells  or  “locations”,  a  flow station (where oil,  water  and sand are
separated out and gas is burnt off) and a helicopter pad shared with Otuasega, which has
five oil wells, one gas field and one manifold (where all pipelines transporting crude oil
meet).  Otuasega is  also the site of  SPDC’s  local  offices and accommodation (otherwise
known as Shell camp). Elebele contains eleven oil wells 17. The designation “Kolo Creek”
did not exist prior to the advent of oil production. A much older Kolo/Emeyal clan area
existed,  covering an area which extended beyond the present  Kolo Creek.  The three
villages are located next to each other, with Elebele in the extreme east, Imiringi in the
middle and Otuasega to the west. They are bordered on their western flank by the non
oil-producing village of Emeyal, which lies to the west of Elebele, and, on their eastern
flank,  by  the  non  oil-producing  village  of  Oruma.  These  neighbouring  villages  are
described in Ogbia as non oil-producing because they do not contain oil wells, although
the use of lateral drilling techniques could mean that oil is extracted from Oruma and
Emeyal lands, although pumped through wells in the neighbouring villages. To the south
of Otuasega lies Edepie, in Yenagoa LGA, whilst to the south of Elebele, along the route to
Yenagoa, lies Okaka. Each village is divided into compounds, generally established by
descendants of the founder of the village. Imiringi has eleven compounds, Otuasega has
ten and Elebele, seven. In 2002, three new compounds were created in Elebele. The official
reason given was that the existing compounds were so big that “the compound chief was
unable to control the compound again” 18. Compounds are to oil companies what LGAs and
states are to the federal government. They are all units for the distribution of oil-related
goods.
45 The  environmental  impact  of  oil  production  and  exploration  in  Nigeria  has  been
extensively covered elsewhere (Frynas 2001; Hutchful 1998). Opinions differ about the
precise contribution of oil production alone to environmental degradation in the Delta.
While some authors (Ashton-Jones 1998) cite problematic farming and fishing methods,
there  is  a  general  consensus  that  environmentally  irresponsible  practices  by  oil
companies  and  the  prevalence  of  faulty or  obsolete  machinery  in  the  absence  of  a
sufficiently robust and effective federal regulatory apparatus, have contributed to the
environmental pollution problems which prevail in the ecologically diverse and fragile
Niger Delta region. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, oil companies, spearheaded largely by
Shell, have shown higher levels of public commitment to improving their environmental
record. Yet the social disruption caused by the introduction of a capital but not labour-
intensive industry in the midst of a predominantly subsistence rural economy with some
localised  domestic  (Niger  Delta)  markets,  has  been  the  background  against  which
increasing number of conflicts between oil companies and their hosts have taken place.
Frynas (2001) has documented the difficulties encountered by the victims of oil-related
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pollution (notably spillages) who have tried to legally oblige oil companies to adequately
compensate them for oil-related damages. In line with Frynas’ thesis, it is argued here
that the full effects of the cumulative impact of environmental problems were felt only by
the end of the 1980s. This was a period when a generalised feeling of “enough is enough”
on the part of oil-producing communities, contributed to unleashing the wave of protests
during which oil companies’ facilities were directly targeted. This period also coincided
with the loss of the derivation principle, a general economic crisis, high levels of inflation
and rising unemployment, all at time when federal and state governments were unable to
make good commitments to investment in welfare spending (health and education).
46 Although the above narrative, which has gained the status of an “official” discourse to
explain the plight of people in the Delta, emphasises the generally negative impact of oil
production on the livelihoods of those in oil-producing communities, it should neither be
presumed,  relative  to  (often  neighbouring)  non  oil-producing  communities,  that  the
livelihoods and security of “oil producers” have only been negatively affected nor that
the burden of  oil-induced disruption has been uniformly shared by all  social  groups.
Indeed, the oil production and exploration processes themselves have engendered high
levels  of  social  differentiation,  enriching  some  whilst  impoverishing  others  both
materially and politically.
The Changing Politics of Community
47 Gerd Bauman (1996) suggests that the term “community” softens the edges of what might
otherwise be perceived as problematic racial or ethnic categories. It gives the semblance
of  an unthreatening “natural”  assemblage  of  people  in  which authority  is  fixed and
uncontested. References to the Asian “community” or the Afro-Caribbean “community”
tend to ring much less problematically than would references to “Asians, Afro-Caribbeans
or  Blacks”.  “Community”  is  a  dishonest  word…  Ethnic  minorities  are  called
“communities” either because it makes them feel better, or because it makes the white
majority feel more secure… Yet the word retains connotations of interpersonal warmth,
shared interest and loyalty (Bauman 1996). Dominic Bryan (2000) has also observed that
the  mobilisation of  the  language  of  “community”  can mask what  he  terms  “fascist”
tendencies which seek to restrict the freedom of “community members” to dissent or
diverge from what is presented as being in the interests of the community 19.
48 Politics in the Delta is  replete with references to “community”.  Federal  government-
speak refers to “oil-producing communities”, a nebulous category which extends beyond
the boundaries of the “host communities” as defined by Shell, to include all the people
living in states that are predominantly oil producing. Since the introduction of federal
government directives for the establishment of “Community Development Committees” (
CDCs) in the late 1970s, community has come to replace the terms of “town” or “village”
which  were  formerly  more  commonly  used.  Shell  and  other  oil  companies  claim to
operate in 1,500 “host communities” 20.  The emphasis on “community assistance” and
“community development” and improving “community relations” since the (late) 1990s
within Shell, has also increased the political salience of the term. Those who benefit from
the oil economy tend to be those deemed to “represent” the “community”, who by virtue
of their position within long-established institutions, notably the “Paramount Ruler” or
“Council of Chiefs”, or more recent creations such as the CDCs and the plethora of youth
organisations (associations) and youth governments that have emerged, have access to
networks within and around the oil industry itself. Yet what actually constitutes “the
community” remains highly contested, particularly in the Delta, where belonging to a
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“community” suggests the possibility of gaining access to oil company resources, given
their emphasis on improving relations with “the community”.
Changing “interlocuteurs valables”—The Rise of the CDC
49 In 1967 Jones argued that the emergence of hereditary monarchs and highly developed
city states in what were formerly eastern delta fishing villages stemmed in large part
from the “gaze” of the European merchant trader (Jones 1989) 21. The Atlantic slave trade
emboldened the status and authority of the institution of chieftaincy,  as it  conferred
monetary  power  and  created  an  institutional  framework  within  which  power  was
necessarily structured around a central figure which could guarantee the repayment of
goods  held  in  trust  by  European  merchants  and  be  rewarded  through  forms  of
commission  or  comey. Kings,  dukes  and  regents  emerged,  albeit  sometimes  with
equivalent local names. In a similar way, the power of the CDC chairman and CDC post
holders has been emboldened by the “gaze” of oil companies, for whom they have become
the first point of contact for questions relating to “community assistance” and, since the
late 1990s, “community development”. If Shell wants to establish a licence to operate in a
given area, “it is the CDC chairman and his cabinet who would discuss. [. . .] The best thing
to get to the town is to see the CDC chairman, it will be later that you see the Council of
Chiefs [. . .] but when the oil companies were not there, nobody cares about them” 22.
50 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Shell tended to work directly with “traditional rulers”
or “paramount rulers”, using them as vehicles to “pacify” potential opposition at the
village level. Informants generally explain the ease with which “paramount rulers” dealt
directly with the oil companies and captured related material benefits for so long by the
low levels of “awareness” or “exposure” and the lack of education amongst the general
population. This allowed them to be generally accepting of Shell’s operating practices,
making few demands. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, emboldened by the increasing
interest  shown  by  returning  elite  groups  of  men  and  women,  victims  of  state
retrenchment  policies  in  the  wake  of  structural  adjustment,  who  sought  chieftaincy
positions as a means of also gaining access to oil-based patronage at the village level,
Councils  of  Chiefs,  began  to  demand the  right  to  “represent”  the  community  in  its
dealings with the oil companies. Chiefs effectively wanted to ensure themselves a share in
the material benefits which up until then had accrued to the Paramount Chiefs alone. A
partnership subsequently developed in Ogbia between the Council of Chiefs and Elders
and the CDCs of Kolo Creek, which throughout the 1980s and particularly 1990s had seen
their relevance as an intermediary body increase.
51 In 1978 CDCs were established in the light of the federally inspired programme of local
government reform, as representative institutions at the village/town level and as the
principle vehicles through which development initiatives were to be co-ordinated.  In
many cases, they replaced earlier models of youth organisation of the Ogbogokum (“errand
boy”) type which were essentially answerable to the Council of Chiefs, and continued to
work hand in hand with the existing village-level government structures. In Elebele no
distinction  is  made  between  the  CDC and  earlier  forms  of  youth  organisation.  Each
compound is represented on the committee, which has its own executive and chairman.
Increasingly, at least to “outsiders” in Otuasega, the CDC and Council of Chiefs and Elders
attempt to create the impression of a “united front”. They claim that “the CDC is the
watchdog of the community from day to day. They are like the labourers. They enforce
the will of the Council of Chiefs and Elders. The Council of Chiefs and Elders give their
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backing  and  decide  on  their  functions.  It  is  an  alliance.  They  engage  in  peaceful
demonstrations and letter writing. The CDC people see the elders and come to discuss” 23.
52 In  non  oil-producing  communities,  elections  to  CDC positions  have  remained  largely
unpoliticised, whilst in oil-producing communities, where elections are hotly contested
affairs,  attempts have been made by the Councils of Chiefs and Elders to deliberately
avoid them, particularly where CDCs have become powerful enough to directly challenge
the authority of “traditional” institutions such as the Chiefs Council and the Paramount
rulership.  Since  1990  and  in  the  light  of  changes  in  oil  companies’  approaches  to
“community relations”,  CDCs have become important interlocutors in their own right
which deal directly with oil companies. CDC positions have therefore become important
sites of  accumulation and are highly fought over,  determining access to employment
opportunities as well as a share in oil-related community compensation. In Elebele and
Otuasega,  there  have  been attempts  to  strictly  control  the  appointment  of  CDC post
holders with nominations by the Chiefs Council rather than by open elections.
53 The diktat of the “community” also prevents individual families who are most affected by
oil spills or land acquisitions from having a say in the way compensation payments are
distributed. When land is acquired for the sinking of a well, “compensation” or “public
relations” payments are made in the form of  a  salary equivalent  to that  of  a  casual
labourer over a given period. The CDC is directly involved in establishing the nature and
the level of compensation to be paid, and how it is to be distributed. The family upon
whose land the well is to be sunk often receives one third of the compensation whilst the
remaining two thirds are distributed to the “community” by the CDC and the Council of
Chiefs  and Elders.  If  compensation  in  the  form of  employment  is  to  be  granted  for
acquired communal lands, the community as a whole benefits. This still allows members
of the CDC and Council of Chiefs to gain a greater share. In the case of Imiringi where
there are eleven compounds, out of a total of twenty jobs, “each compound may receive
one, the remainder is divided up between the Council of Chiefs and the CDC members” 24.
In Elebele, one former third-class chief was severely sanctioned because he was accused
of having signed papers with a claims agent to authorise the sharing of compensation
money between family members after the case went to court. No money was given to CDC
members or to the youth organisations. He was subsequently dethroned (lost his chief
status) because he allegedly signed the papers without CDC members or youths being
present, a claim which he denies 25.
54 The CDC chairman is not an officially remunerated post, but the post holder through his
direct  access  to  Shell’s  Community  Liaison  Officer  (CLO)  based  in  Kolo  Creek  and
Community  Development  Advisors  based in  Port  Harcourt,  has  unhindered access  to
unofficial  channels for accumulation.  The CDC chairman plays the role of  gatekeeper,
determining the access of would-be oil servicing company contractors and job seekers to
the oil company, given the critical role the CDC plays today in securing the company’s
licence to operate. The CDC chairman’s post has become much sought after, particularly
by young male graduates, or those with some level of higher education who have also
gained  a  reputation  in  village-level  youth  politics.  Indeed  leadership  of  youth
organisations is  seen as a stepping-stone to eventual  CDC chairmanship and,  in some
cases,  political  office 26.  Leaders  of  youth  organisations  tend  to  cultivate  their
relationships with the oil company field representatives with a view to securing both
short- and medium-term goals. The CDC chairman of Elebele in 2002 had been a youth
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leader for four years before becoming CDC chairman, during which time he cultivated a
close relationship with Shell’s CLOs. Today these contacts give him the clout as CDC
chairman to mobilise young men when necessary to “descend on Shell offices in Imiringi
[. . .], make noise and bring pressure to bear on the CLO” to extract social provisions 27.
55 Women are not represented on any of  the community decision-making bodies which
determine access to compensation and other oil-related goods from Shell.  Even when
women have  tried  to  use  men as  intermediaries  to  submit  proposals  to  Shell,  these
proposals have remained in the pipeline but have never been implemented. Since the
introduction of the Land Use Act in 1978, compensation is granted to those whose land is
acquired or disturbed by oil production but only for economic crops or trees lost. Women
tend to own the farms, i.e. the crops, even if they do not own the land upon which the
crops are farmed. However, they rarely receive compensation for economic crops lost. If
they do, it is generally only for marginal sums especially because the “community” insists
on receiving two thirds of the compensation paid where individual farms or property are
concerned 28.  Prior  to  the  general  strike,  social  provision for  women from Shell  was
minimal  and,  where  at  all  existent,  was  channelled  through  organs  like  the  Elebele
Women’s  Co-operative  Society.  The  only  women  who  could  participate  in  the  co-
operatives were “land owners”, which in Shell speak means being from land upon which
Shell’s oil locations are sited. Support to these co-operatives is sporadic and inconsistent
and dependent on the good will  of the staff  appointed as outreach co-ordinators.  An
evaluation by one member of the women’s co-operative concluded that “after 15 years in
existence, Shell has not done as much as one machete, one hoe, one wheel barrow, one
spade and a small amount of fertilizer”. This was for a group of ten people in the co-
operative who were beneficiaries of loans of N 5,000 (euros38) per woman—a total  of
N 50,000 for the whole group 29.
ELIMOTU—An Uprising of Sorts
56 In August 1998, Maxwell Oko, an undergraduate student in Architecture at the Rivers
state  University  of  Science  and  Technology  and  active  member  of  the  National
Association  of  Nigerian  Students  (NANS),  who  had  lived  for  most  of  his life  in  Port
Harcourt in Rivers state, left university half way through his course to “return” home to
Otuasega, in order to “mobilise his people in Otuasega” and bring pressure to bear on
Shell. According to Oko, “undergrads had status amongst the people who would listen to
them… [we] wanted to make Shell bring basic benefits to the community as it had done in
other communities… [there was] ‘nothing, no roads, electricity or water’” 30. After several
unsuccessful meetings with Shell’s CLOs, Shell’s reluctance to listen encouraged Maxwell
and others from neighbouring Elebele and Imiringi to come together to present Shell with
a joint proposal. ELIMOTU was born, the name taken from the first letters of the names of
each  village:  EL-ebele,  IM-iringi,  and  OTU-asega.  A  co-ordinating  committee  was
established with Maxwell  Oko as  the committee chairman.  Monday Eribor,  also from
Otuasega, was another ELIMOTU committee member who had also left university before
graduating and had a similar activist background but was particularly rooted in Ogbia-
wide activism and linked to similar movements throughout the Delta. His early activism
began with MORETO (Movement for Reparations to Ogbia), of which he was a founding
member alongside IYC founder Oronto Douglas. Eribor also participated in the Movement
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) campaign (made famous by the late Ken
Saro-Wiwa) in the early to mid-1990s 31. The preponderance of university-educated men
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amongst  the  ELIMOTU leadership  is  said  to  have  frightened off  many lesser-educated
young men in Kolo Creek who feared a divergence of interests 32.
57 At a meeting in Imiringi town hall in October 1998, a decision was taken to organise a
“general  strike”.  A joint  communiqué was signed between the representatives of  the
Council of Chiefs and Elders and the CDC and Youth Body of all three villages, signalling
their intention to engage collectively in “peaceful protests”. “The morning before [the
general strike] everyone [Shell staff] was asked to come out of their rooms and sit outside.
The caterers and cooks came out and locked rooms. The Engineers gave us two vehicles.
We turned off the [gas] flare and locked the flow of oil. We went on hunger strike until
afternoon. Everybody was out of the premises so there was nothing to destroy” 33.
58 During the general strike of October 1998 the flow station was shut down, disrupting
Shell’s activities for one week. A process of dialogue was initiated by the CDC chairman,
but  few  immediate  concrete  benefits  were  seen.  Unlike  in  similar  demonstrations
throughout the Delta (Umuechem and Ogoni earlier in the 1990s), the response of the
state security forces to the general strike was not coercive. Colonel Obi, the then military
administrator in Bayelsa, even participated in the dialogue with the oil companies that
followed the general strike. Things took a dramatically different turn some three months
later,  after the Kaiama Declaration of December 1998. This was the result of years of
disparate youth protests throughout the Niger Delta and organised by a small group of
mainly Ijaw environmental  rights activists  associated with ERA (Environmental  Rights
Action, Friends of the Earth Nigeria). The all-Ijaw youth meeting in Kaiama town, in the
Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA north of Bayelsa state, which was attended by representatives of
forty Ijaw clans throughout the Niger Delta and beyond, gave birth to the Ijaw Youth
Council and a declaration containing a list of ultimatums to the Nigerian government and
the  oil  companies,  with  respect  to  political  and  fiscal  autonomy  (resource  control),
cleaning  up  environmental  pollution,  and  the  provision  of  jobs  and  sustainable
livelihoods for the Ijaw. The aftermath of violence and the heavy-handedness of the state
security forces which it unleashed, particularly in and around Yenagoa, created chaos in
Bayelsa for much of 1999. The governorship elections which had been scheduled to take
place (since) the previous year, had to be halted for three months because of the unrest.
The presidential elections of May 1999 were also shrouded in violence.
59 Shell  was forced to halt its operations in the Kolo Creek area for one year,  and only
resumed activities in October 1999. Throughout Shell’s absence, the process of dialogue
that had been initiated with ELIMOTU after the general strike in October 1998, continued.
In fact, the Kaiama Declaration gave ELIMOTU’s campaign greater political clout and made
Shell more amenable to ELIMOTU’s demands. Throughout the year of Shell’s absence and
somewhat in contradiction with the precepts of Operation Climate Change, one of five
ultimatums  given  during  the Kaiama  Declaration,  which  threatened  to  force  all  oil
companies  to withdraw from the Niger Delta  pending the resolution of  the resource
control  issue,  ELIMOTU activists  pursued  a  strategy  of  “surveillance”  guarding  Shell’s
locations. “Because this is our area, we don’t want to destroy [. . .].  That would make
matters worse.” Instead, the uprising of 1998 transformed itself into a security outfit,
guarding Shell’s assets in such a way as to permit their return in October 1999. ELIMOTU
activists were subsequently to ask to be compensated for security services rendered.
60 In October 1999, a meeting once again took place between Shell executives and the co-
ordinating committee of ELIMOTU in Imiringi Town Hall. The meeting was also attended by
Between Discourse and Reality
Cahiers d’études africaines, 178 | 2005
19
a number of Bayelsa state government dignitaries, the paramount chiefs of each of the
villages  concerned  and  representatives  of  Shell’s  executive in  Port  Harcourt.  All
participants witnessed the signing of an agreement between Shell and ELIMOTU in the
form of  a  Memorandum of  Understanding  (MOU)  detailing  the  benefits  which  would
accrue to the community once Shell resumed work.
61 Multiple accounts abound as to whether Shell offered N 22.8 million, or whether a request
for this amount was made by ELIMOTU but declined by Shell. Whichever version of events
is  correct,  the  deputy  governor  himself  intervened  to  request  that  51 jobs (17 per
community), whether real or fictitious, be created. In addition, 20 items were listed as
requests from ELIMOTU to Shell,  amongst which were demands for training and skills
acquisition, one vehicle, a hospital and a health centre, a road, a water system and a
training programme for drivers from the each of the communities. ELIMOTU also made
requests for villages outside the immediate Kolo Creek area. These were declined. In total
only six of the requests made were actually accepted 34.
62 Problems erupted after the agreement had been signed over who was to benefit from the
“17 employment  chances”  per  village,  whether  it  was  to  be  the  committed  ELIMOTU
activists who personally carried out the surveillance work or the wider “community” as
represented by its  governing bodies and those whom it  deemed eligible for the “job
opportunities” in question. The Council of Chiefs and other “free-riding” members of the
community felt that although ELIMOTU members had carried out the “surveillance” (read
security)  work,  the  “community’s  name”  had  been  used  in  vain  to  give  political
legitimacy to ELIMOTU’s actions. For this reason they felt that ELIMOTU members could not
justifiably “chop alone”.
63 A struggle ensued in each of the three villages. In Imiringi, on 24 December 1999, a young
man,  Mr  Otobu,  was  fatally  shot  in  the  head.  Maxwell  Oko,  who  had  subsequently
emerged as the IYC’s Central Zone chairman (representing and organising IYC activities in
Bayelsa  state),  Monday  Eribor  and  other  members  of  the  ELIMOTU co-ordinating
committee, were subsequently banished from Otuasega village, and the houses of ELIMOTU
members burnt down. In Otuasega, families were divided down the middle. The family
members of those closely associated with ELIMOTU were also forced to leave the village
and  to  reside  in  neighbouring  Imiringi.  By  the  end  of  2002,  although  some  sort  of
reconciliation was underway to reintegrate those excluded back into the community, five
court cases were still  pending over rights to employment chances in recompense for
surveillance services rendered. Maxwell Oko and other ELIMOTU members from Otuasega
were defended in court by the solicitors’ firm of Uche Onyeagucha (Chinda and Chinda
Esquire, Port Harcourt), now a member of the House of Representatives for Imo state
since the May 2003 elections but then lawyer and environmental rights activist with ERA
(Environmental Rights Action), the NGO out of which the IYC emerged.
64 In Elebele, the strong-arm tactics of the paramount ruler and the Council of Chiefs and
Elders, managed to keep community conflict to a minimum. The Council of Chiefs and the
CDC decided how each of the 17 “employment chances” were to be distributed. They were
eventually made to rotate between each of the compounds so that, every two months, a
new set  of  young men would benefit  from “salaries” which were simply shared out.
However,  those  who  were  actually  involved  in  the  surveillance  work  received  the
equivalent of two employment chances for every one shared between the other fortunate
community members, many of whom were elders, compound chiefs and deputy chiefs. In
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Otuasega, because of the cases of litigation that followed, no more than six boys in “the
community” became recipients of the “employment chances”, whilst the remainder were
divided between ELIMOTU members, possibly as a result of the legal support they enjoyed.
65 In spite of the conflicts that it brought to the surface, the ELIMOTU episode meant that
some of the social amenities which groups in the three villages had been fighting for,
began to be provided. In Elebele, after October 1999, an MOU was signed guaranteeing
Shell’s investment in one community project per year, in addition to the 17 “employment
chances”.  Unlike  neighbouring  non  oil-producing  communities  which  rely  on  the
inconsistent and often non-existent electricity supplied by the gas turbine, Elebele, since
the general strike, has also been receiving electricity via Shell, albeit at “half-current”.
Women  also  began  to  receive  much  greater  attention  through  Shell’s  new outreach
programmes, notably the Women’s Action Committee (WAC), whose specific remit was to
build  resource  training  centres  for  women  in  Kolo  Creek  and beyond  (similar  WAC
initiatives  were initiated by Shell  in  other  “host  communities”,  notably in Oporoma,
Southern  Ijaw  LGA).  This  seeming  turnaround  in  Shell’s  approach  to  community
development in which it now believes it has a role to play after having spent decades
arguing that social investment was the responsibility of the Nigerian government, needs
to be read against the background of Shell’s continued recourse to the coercive apparatus
of  the  state  and  to  ad-hoc  measures  intended  to  disorganise  local  protests  when
community demands appear to be overwhelming.
Ijaw Nationalism and ELIMOTU
66 ELIMOTU is often heralded as the “earliest of all IYC movements” 35. In the words of Oronto
Douglas, “it was also amongst the ‘militant organisations’ that formed COOL (Committee of
Organizational Leaders), a central policy-making body within the IYC”.  The link between
the IYC and ELIMOTU as reflected in the leadership of Maxwell Oko, chairman of the IYC
Central  Zone  and  chairman  of  the  organizing  committee  of  ELIMOTU,  temporarily
strengthened  the  political  clout  of  hitherto  excluded  groups  in  Kolo  Creek,  notably
university graduates and university drop-outs allied to young men with limited formal
education who had remained in the village but who were also excluded from political and
therefore economic power at a village level. ELIMOTU was to some extent an alliance of a
cross section of interest groups. This alliance came apart as soon as the political tussles
arose over how material benefits were to be shared. The nasty taste that the ELIMOTU
experience  has  left  in  the  mouths  of  those  who sought  to  hang on to  their role  of
representing “the community” and of others who, in spite of ELIMOTU’s efforts, continued
to remain on the margins of political power at the village level, suggests that statements
portraying ELIMOTU as a popular community uprising need to be qualified. The ELIMOTU
experience reflected underlying antagonisms between competing generations and classes
within the three villages.
67 The links between the IYC and ELIMOTU meant that the IYC also came to be associated with
a group that was politically “excluded” from some villages and highly criticised in others.
One informant noted that “Imiringi has not been part of that [the IYC]. It is dominated by
Izons [. . .] because they have their man at the top, as the governor 36 [. . .] many of these
formations have been politicised, and many people go into these things for selfish basis
[. . .] you see someone leading you, but after some time, when he got something, some
dollars from all these oil companies, he step aside and feed himself”. Others blamed the
IYC for the conflict that arose between ELIMOTU activists and others in the villages.
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68 In spite  of  the association in people’s  minds of  ELIMOTU with the IYC,  in  many ways
ELIMOTU marked  a  departure  from the  IYC’s  philosophy  which  had  been  inspired  by
organisations like MORETO, the Movement for Reparations to Ogbia, founded in 1993 by
Oronto Douglas and friends in order to enable “oil-producing communities” as a whole,
rather than host communities alone, to be at the forefront of the struggle. Here “oil-
producing community” refers to a group broader than the locality from which oil  is
extracted,  but  the wider community within which the “host” community is  situated.
MORETO was concerned with “reparations” for the whole of Ogbia in the light of Oloibiri’s
fate, an area devastated after years of oil production, then abandoned when the wells ran
dry in the 1970s 37.
69 Members of ELIMOTU’s  executive committee are explicit about the need to distinguish
between oil-producing and non oil-producing communities,  because of the manner in
which government officials from non oil-producing parts of the state have been able to
use  their  authority  to  capture  oil  rents.  Federal  initiatives  intended  to  alleviate  oil
induced disruptions, through ministerial and commissioner appointments or through its
sponsored Niger Delta development initiatives like OMPADEC (Oil and Mineral Producing
Areas Development Commission) and more recently the NDDC (Niger Delta Development
Commission), established in 1999, have tended to benefit parts of the state where oil is
not drilled, like the Kolokuma/Opokuma LGA, but not the Kolo Creek area itself, because
of the prevalence of highly placed politicians from these areas 38.
70 There is, therefore, an inherent tension within Ijaw nationalism as advocated by men like
Maxwell  Oko,  who  represents  a  Kolo  Creek-centred  aspiration  (albeit  one  which  is
opposed to serve the interests  of  established elites  within Kolo Creek),  and the Ijaw
nationalism advocated by men like Oronto Douglas, who is not from an oil-producing part
of Ogbia and whose MORETO trajectory sets the tone for his Ijaw nationalism. For Douglas,
the bulk of Nigeria’s petroleum resources are found in “Ijaw land”; oil “belongs” to all
Ijaw. He and others have tried to argue that all members of the Ijaw nation as a whole are
“oil producers”, as have those in Kolokuma/Opokuma, who, in spite of the absence of oil,
still see and feel the effects of gas flaring and pollution 39. The association of pan-ethnic
Ijaw nationalism historically with a particular geographical and political axis (Nembe-
Oloibiri) in Ogbia, as evidenced by the work of G. I. Amangala, writer of the first published
work by an Ijaw on Ijaw identity, founder of the Ogbia brotherhood, first Ogbanobhan of
Ogbia, and a native of Oloibiri,  may also explain why Kolo Creek residents have been
reluctant to take up the pan-Ijaw ethnic banner.
Changing Identities in Kolo Creek
71 The ELIMOTU episode highlighted inter-class and inter-generational cleavages within and
between each of the Kolo Creek villages. It also consolidated relationships between each
of the three villages signalling the coming of age of a distinct Kolo Creek identity, whose
emergence was facilitated by successive years of oil production activity, consolidated by
the establishment of a link road in 1997.
72 Before  oil  arrived  in  1971-1972,  relationships  between  the  three  villages  and  their
neighbours  were  based  on  “inter-marriage,  wrestling  and  football”.  In  spite  of  the
emergence of a more cohesive Kolo Creek identity, when competition for jobs and oil-
related benefits is acute,  village identities have tended to supersede the three-village
“host  community”  or  “landlord”  identities.  There  is  a  contested  boundary  between
Otuasega and Imiringi. The advent of oil production and exploration from 1971 onwards
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led to a series of renewed disputes over land ownership (earlier boundary disputes had
taken place in the 1960s)  and court cases in 1974,  1975 and 1976,  to establish which
community was to be awarded compensation for any area and/or crops destroyed 40. In
1994-1995, Wilbros, a US company, began oil and gas pipeline construction in Otuasega
and started paying casual labourers higher salaries than Shell and other oil  servicing
companies had been paying. Many from neighbouring Imiringi and Elebele flocked to
Otuasega to seek work. Previously people could migrate between the three villages in
search of work as long as good contacts were established with the site foreman. Once the
stakes had been raised, Otuasega residents tried to stop Elebele and Imiringi boys from
taking up potentially more lucrative jobs in their village; “it was then that people became
enlightened  and  conscious  that  everyone  should  now  begin  to  work  within  their
territory” 41. Today, casual workers are no longer allowed to migrate between the three
villages in search of work. The same rules do not apply with respect to local contractors,
particularly where pipeline security (surveillance)  is  concerned,  as  workers  from the
three villages are still known to work together 42.
73 The oil-bearing nature of each of these villages has created a consciousness of difference
between them and non oil-producing members of the same Kolo/Emeyal clan and the
wider  population  of  Ogbia.  In  2000,  when  Governor  Alamieyeseigha  of  Bayelsa  state
unilaterally created 24 new LGAs within the state, Kolo Creek LGA was amongst them. It
was carved out of Ogbia LGA. All 24 LGAs, however, later had to be disbanded because they
had not  been approved  by  the  National  Assembly.  They  were  replaced  by  caretaker
committees  responsible  for  overseeing  their  transition  to  “development  centres”.
Although  now  defunct,  the  “unofficial  LGA”  has  left  its  imprint  on  the  popular
imagination of Kolo Creek residents and given them a foretaste of what it could mean to
gain political recognition for the separate identity which oil has created. This identity is
predicated on the need to restrict the flow of amenities to the communities in which oil
locations are sited.
74 The advent of the oil economy has exacerbated already-existing divisions between Kolo
Creek and its neighbours, dating back to the days of the Eastern Regional Government
(1946-1966) and civil war (1967-1970) which divided an NCNC/Biafra-supporting Emeyal
from an NDC-Nigerian government-supporting Imiringi 43. Attempts made to restrict the
distribution  of  oil-related  benefits  to  the  Kolo  Creek  communities  alone,  and  Shell’s
reluctance to listen to requests for social investment from “non-host” communities have
also created deep divisions between Kolo Creek and its neighbours. “These communities
that don’t have oil, they hate us, we have a common boundary but there is oil here and
not there. Imiringi and Emeyal hate each other” 44. In 1996, a violent conflict broke out
between Emeyal and Imiringi which led to one fatality. The neighbouring communities of
Otuasega and Oruma have also clashed to such an extent that each village no longer
attends the wake-keepings of the other.
75 Throughout the Niger Delta, in areas where the geographical spread of oil production and
exploration activities does not coincide with pre-existing community identities (village,
clan, ethnic), oil has tended to fragment and undermine them, giving rise to new micro-
identities. Neighbouring villages like Otuasega and Emeyal, both of which are part of the
Emeyal “clan”, still take part in the same festivals (e.g. the the Kolo fishing festival) and
participate in the same clan meetings. The Emeyal Council of Chiefs is held every month
and often discusses the extension of Shell provisions to the rest of the clan. Although
relations  have  been quite  strained because  of  the  unequal  distribution of  oil-related
Between Discourse and Reality
Cahiers d’études africaines, 178 | 2005
23
benefits across the clan, some progress has been made through the intervention of the
Ogbia Brotherhood. This has led to the extension of the link-road between Otuasega and
neighbouring communities. Other benefits have, however, been withheld. This is not just
the result of the “bad faith” of Shell, but also of protests mounted by residents of the oil-
producing Kolo Creek communities themselves who argue that “Emeyal cannot expect to
have that which people from an oil-producing community have fought for” and “which
are even insufficient to meet their needs”. This is the background against which, in the
event of oil spillages, residents of Kolo Creek using buckets and spades attempt to stem
the spread of the oil spilled by blocking it off so that neighbouring communities will not
be able to claim compensation for damage done to their lands and waterways 45.
76 The schism between the Kolo Creek communities and the rest of Ogbia is also reflected in
the politics of patronage at the level of the Ogbia local government, from which Kolo
Creek residents tend to be excluded.  As one informant noted,  the Local  Government
Council  “has done nothing for Elebele.  Only during the time of the death of Melford
Okilo’s mother, a casual (temporary) road which is being used until now” was built 46. The
LGA government chairman position is supposed to be “zoned”, alternating between the
three districts in Ogbia (Kolo, Anyama and Oloibiri) for the duration of each electoral
term. Prior to the 2002 dissolution of the Local Government Councils after the expiration
of their mandates, the chairman of the LGA Council was from Emeyal. During his tenure,
boreholes were sunk in Kolo (another village/town outside the Kolo Creek area)  and
Emeyal, but none were sunk in any of the three Kolo Creek villages.
77     
78 ELIMOTU was an alliance of a cross section of classes, sexes and generations in the three
villages, protesting at the lack of oil company investment in their social and economic
development. It was linked to the IYC, through its leadership in the person of Maxwell
Oko who also became chairman of  the IYC central  zone and organisationally because
ELIMOTU was  a  member  of  an  IYC central  co-ordinating  body.  When the  intra-village
alliance broke down, ELIMOTU and the IYC were widely ostracised and rejected as part and
parcel of the same disruptive self-serving movement. However, upon closer inspection, it
becomes apparent that ELIMOTU was actually cut from a very different cloth to that of
pan-Ijaw nationalism. It grew up in the Kolo Creek area, which was part of Kolo, whose
elites had traditionally stood outside an Oloibiri-based, Nembe-centric Ijaw nationalism,
inspired by the work of Rev G. I. Amangala. Secondly, ELIMOTU was in favour of the rights
of  oil-producing  host  communities,  over  and  above  the  rights  of  non  oil-producing
communities, whether or not they were neighbouring members of the same clan or part
of the wider Ogbia or wider pan-Ijaw ethnic group. ELIMOTU and MORETO, the movement
for reparations to Ogbia, modelled along the lines of MOSOP, and founding pillar of youth-
led Ijaw nationalism of the 1990s, were ideologically distinct currents.
79 The  consequences  of  these  observations  are  far  reaching  for  how  we  interpret  and
understand  the  motivations  behind  people’s  attachment  to  ethnic  group  or  ethnic
nationalism and even to nationalism per se. Ijaw nationalists in order to strengthen their
political clout, model themselves on the national stage as Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic
group, a description that would by right entitle them to a greater share of the nation’s
political and economic resources. They package the widespread unrest in the Niger Delta
as the revolt of an Ijaw nation,  sick and tired of suffering the negative effects of oil
production, and of being excluded from having a say in how the billions of naira that
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come from oil are distributed and spent. When viewed from a micro perspective, just as
the alliances  between members  of  this  would-be pan-ethnic  ensemble,  this  narrative
however begins to break down.
80 Firstly,  many of  those engaged in the protests  can be seen to display an ambiguous
attachment  to  the  idea  of  belonging  to  a  pan-Ijaw group,  preferring  to  reserve  the
benefits of protest to oil producers, and when push comes to shove, to members of their
village, and when really under pressure to members of their “community”, family and so
on. Secondly, protesters themselves, far from being simply antagonistic to the nefarious
activities of  oil  companies,  seek to impose themselves as alternative interlocutors,  in
order to capture the benefits of oil production and exploration for themselves as new
“community representatives”. What the pan-Ijaw packaged narrative often misses out is
the  complexity  of  social  struggles  taking  place  within  oil-producing  communities
themselves over what it means to belong to the community and who has the right to
speak on its behalf.  ELIMOTU members were challenging the rights of those who have
traditionally  served  as  interlocutors  with  Shell  (Councils  of  Chiefs  and  community
development  committee  representatives),  suggesting  a  call  for  new  sorts  of
accountability. They were at the same time challenging other contending social groups
(less educated men in particular) who also seek to stake their claim to be alternative
interlocutors.  The  preponderance  of  undergraduate  or  university  drop-out  men,  and
some women, in the leadership of ELIMOTU is evidence of this. ELIMOTU chose to “guard”
instead of “destroying” Shell installations at a time when chaos reigned in Bayelsa and
most  oil  companies  had  halted  their  operations.  ELIMOTU’s  decision  to  protect  Shell
facilities was also a means of containing what could have been a more violent response by
young men in the three villages, whose access to decision making and direct contact with
Shell  had  been  repeatedly  blocked  by  members  of  the  Council  of  Chiefs  and  whose
influence over the ELIMOTU executive was also limited.
81 These conclusions are not intended to suggest that community-wide protests against oil
company excesses have not taken place, sometimes with positive and negative effects.
However, to presume that everything that calls itself “youth led” or “community led” is
the product of a “popular uprising” or that everything that packages itself as “anti-oil
company” is  purely descriptive,  is  to underestimate the ideological  charge associated
with  these  labels,  which  are  part  of  a  set  of  legitimising  discourses  used  by  Ijaw
nationalists and other pan-ethnic entrepreneurs, seeking greater political relevance at
the federal and state level within Nigeria.
82 The Kolo Creek experience and the disintegration and reformulation of cultural identities
which  have  accompanied  struggles  over  oil-related  goods,  also  suggest  that  we
interrogate  more  closely  the  cultural  content  of  Ijaw nationalism in  particular,  with
which Kolo Creek “nationalism” has at times allied itself, and nationalism more generally.
Nigeria’s history, from the heady days of Nigerian nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s, to
the ethnic nationalisms engendered by the never-ending saga of federally sanctioned
state  and  local  government  creation  which  have  continued  up  until  the  present,  is
littered with examples of convenient culturally grounded alliances. Indeed what appears
to have taken place in Kolo Creek simply mirrors what has been taking place throughout
Nigeria on a nationwide scale, ever since fiscal centralisation was introduced from 1967
onwards  and  ever  since  the  federal  government  assumed  responsibility  for  the
distribution of oil-derived revenues to the different states of the Federation. The Nigerian
state plays a critical role in creating incentives for new “ethnicities” to emerge around
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existing or desired states and LGAs. With the withdrawal of the Nigerian state from its role
in social welfare provision in the wake of economic crisis and the introduction of the SAP,
oil  companies  have  now replaced  and surpassed  the  role  of  the  state  in  many host
communities. Their ability to distribute patronage in much the same way as the state has
done has set in motion similar processes of ethnic imagining and the proliferation of new
and useful micro-identities capable of securing access to oil-related whilst denying access
to “others”.
83     
Nuffield College, Oxford University. 
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NOTES
1. There is a history of the conflict between the two communities that make up Nembe
Local Government Area. Ogboloma or Ogbolomabiri and Bassambiri. Ogboloma/biri is a
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composite of Ogboloma and Ogbolomabiri. The use of either appellation is deemed to
reflect a particular political bias in favour of one side or the other. Ogboloma is used by
indigenes of Ogboloma/biri, whilst Ogbolomabiri is used by indigenes of Bassambiri. Both
communities are separated by a small creek and a bridge which has been deliberately
destroyed and left unrepaired for many years since 1991.
2. Human Rights Watch Reports, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria2/
P327_87031, and http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/nigeria041003.htm.
3. Chuks OKOCHA, Chuks AKUNNA & Lillian OKENWA, “Observers Note ‘Significant Flaws’ in
Five States, TMG Name Rivers, Bayelsa, Enugu, Imo, C/River”, Thisday, 22 April 2003.
4. Politicians and journalists frequently refer to the “youth restiveness” in the Niger
Delta. The term suggests a reluctance to seriously investigate the causes of the problems
in the region and to attribute blame to “youth” as a homogeneous antisocial category.
5. See text of “The Kaiama Declaration”, p. 5.
6. Interview with Oronto Douglas, 29 March 2002, Port Harcourt. Douglas is an
environmental and human rights lawyer, former member of the Ijaw Youth Council and
leading thinker within contemporary Ijaw nationalist politics.
7. The INC (Ijaw National Congress) founded in 1991 and the IYC (Ijaw Youth Council),
founded in 1998 are two pan-Ijaw political organizations.
8. This is based on the often quoted “between 8 and 12 million” figure. Sokari EKINE (2001)
quotes the figure of 12 million; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1999: 92) quotes 8 million. The
accuracy of these figures is, however, a little compromised by the absence of reliable
census data. Population census figures from 1952 (the least disputed of Nigeria’s many
controversial subsequent census exercises), suggests that at the time the Ijaw, both in the
Eastern and Western regions, were no more than 900,000. Since the 1952-1953 census, the
total size of the Nigerian population, then roughly 30 million, has at the most quadrupled,
standing at 127 million. It is unlikely that the Ijaw population would have increased up to
eightfold during the same period. However the manner in which Ijaws were categorised
and counted could have led to an underestimate—Kalabari, Nembe, Okrika, Ibani, Opobo,
Andoni, Ogbia, Epie-Atissa and all those groups which today form part of the Ijaw political
universe, may not have been counted as Ijaw during the 1952 census.
9. The article does not cover the recent so-called manifestations of Ijaw ethnic
nationalism that have taken the form of an armed battle between competing militia, and
expressed as threats to disrupt oil company facilities in Port Harcourt, leading to the
intervention of the Nigerian Army in and around Port Harcourt, in September 2004. The
coverage which these events have received in the international press as well as the
decisive military response of the Nigerian civilian government, is not unrelated to the
manipulation by the leader of the main militia group, Alhaji Asari Dokubo, of his Muslim
identity and his adoption of the name “Muhajid”. The dramatic increase in oil prices
which at the same time rocketed to S50 per barrel, have also been a cause for
international concern (MANBY (2004). The central role of the one time much disputed IYC
president, Dokubo (2001-2003), in the main armed gang, the Niger Delta People’s
Volunteer Force, and his use of Ijaw nationalist rhetoric, explains why recent events are
being portrayed in an Ijaw nationalist light. This article is however more concerned with
the IYC as conceived by its founders, prior to 2001. Dokubo’s recent adventure although
not the subject of this article is understood as directly related to party politics and to the
deterioration in his once close relationship with the Rivers state governor, Dr Peter Odili,
today enjoying a second term in office, which Dokubo claims to have been instrumental in
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securing. Today Odili nurses vice presidential ambitions in the forthcoming 2007
elections and is suspected of financially backing other militia gangs, notably Ateke Tom,
to deal with the Dokubo threat.
10. Official estimates, based on the 1991 census figures, put the figure at 126.6 million. See
Vanguard, 6 June 2003. The National Population Commission recently had to dispute the
claim by the former minister for internal affairs that the nation’s population could be as
high as 160 million. The NPC instead maintains that the nation’s population as projected
by the commission stands at 126 million based on the 1991 census figure of 88.9 million
and a growth rate of 2.83% per annum. Census data has been particularly controversial in
Nigeria since the 1963 census, because of a tendency to inflate figures in anticipation of
political rewards.
11. AGHEYISI suggests that there are 400 language groups in Nigeria, 390 of which are
spoken by 20% of the population.
12. Interview with Mr Okpara, Kolo town, Ogbia, 20 June 2002.
13. Interview with Isaac Osuoka, January 2002, Port Harcourt.
14. Interview with HRM J. C. Egba, Olei X, Ogbanobhan of Olei (Oloibiri), Port Harcourt, 8
June 2002.
15. Interview with Chief Atata, Imiringi, Ogbia, 28 June 2002.
16. The term village here is used as opposed to the more nebulous term “community”—
which has entered into popular discourse in response to state policies (notably the
introduction of “community development committees” in 1978/1979 and oil company-
inspired discourses of “community development”, “community assistance“, “community
relations”, “host community”. Locally there is a reluctance to refer to these entities as
villages, because of the “backwardness” implied by the term, which does not convey the
size of the unit in question, the availability of pipe-borne water, varying levels of
electricity supply, oil-production activity, the influx of outsiders from all over Nigeria.
The term “town” often used particularly in the Igbo hinterland areas to the north of the
Delta to refer to an agglomeration of villages, could be used instead, as “town council”
and “town hall” are often referred to, although the term “community” tends to be
reserved for describing an associated group of compounds.
17. Agip actually has the deepest oil well in Ogbia, in Opribeni oil fields, in Epebo in
Anyama, which in 2001 was the site of bloody clashes between Epebo and Emadike.
However, this field lies outside the site of our enquiry.
18. Interview with Gabriel Michael Ogbara, Elebele, Ogbia, CDC chairman, 22 June 2002.
19. Ideas also articulated in a presentation at Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC)
workshop: “Ethnicity: Division or Cohesion? New challenges in a changing world”, 17
December 2003, London.
20. Interview with Theo Wellington, SPDC, Port Harcourt, July 2002.
21. See also E. J. ALAGOA (1971), who challenges the view that city-states and sovereigns
emerged merely as a result of the European gaze, but argues that they had begun to
emerge independently prior to the arrival of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.
22. Interview with Eluan Ebelha, civil servant, teacher, working with Anyama
Government Secondary School, Ogbia, but from Imiringi, 18 June 2002.
23. Interview with representatives of Council of Chiefs and Elders and CDC, Otuasega, 22
June 2002.
24. Interview with Eluan Ebelha, Anyama, 18 June 2002.
25. Interview with Chief Abott D. Edum, Elebele, Ogbia, 21 June 2002.
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26. See the case of Honorable Target Segibo, English graduate of the University of Ibadan,
who at the age of 24 became the Youth President in Oporoma, a stepping-stone for
political office subsequently. In 1999, he became the APP member of Bayelsa state House
of Assembly Representatives for Southern Ijaw II Constituency.
27. Interview with Gabriel Michael Ogbara, Elebele, Ogbia, CDC Chairmanchairman,
22 June 2002.
28. Interview with Ayekite Jackson, women leader, Otuasega, June 2002.
29. Interview with Florence Abuge, Elebele, Ogbia, 22 June 2002.
30. Interviews with Maxwell Oko, Yenagoa, Bayelsa state capital, August 2002.
31. Interview with Monday Eribor, 3 August 2002.
32. Interview with Ama Benson, Otuasega, 26 June 2002.
33. Interview with Maxwell Oko, Yenagoa, Bayelsa state capital, August 2002.
34. Interview with Stanley, Elimotu activist, Imiringi, June 2002.
35. Interview with Oronto Douglas, 6 May 2002, Port Harcourt.
36. Since the creation of Bayelsa state in 1996, and the reintroduction of civilian rule, the
governor of Bayelsa state has been from the “Izon” group, i.e. speakers of one of the
many Izon or Ijaw dialects, popularly referred to in Bayelsa as the “core Ijaw” as opposed
to the “non-core Ijaw” made up of speakers of other languages who at national level are
nevertheless also considered as Ijaw.
37. Interview with Monday Eribor, Maxwell Oko’s House, Yenagoa, 3 August 2002. Eribor,
one of the youths active in IYC and ELIMOTU was also kicked out of Otuasega.
38. Dan Etete, Petroleum Minister under Abacha 1993-1998, from Kolokuma/Opokuma 
LGA where there is no oil, Timi Alaibe presently in charge of Finance and Administration
in NDDC, and also from the Kolokuma/Opokuma. Otuasega has however persistently
turned out powerful federal and state politicians, notably Ronami Abah, National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) secretary during the Second Republic, and Claudius Enegesi, Commissioner
for Agriculture and Natural Resources, and later for Transport, PDP stalwart and
“kingmaker” for Bayelsa state Governor Alamieyeseigha.
39. Interview with Oronto Douglas, Port Harcourt, April 2003, in which he expressed
outrage at the extreme and violent response of the federal forces in Odi in 1999,
ostensibly to quell threats to oil production, despite the fact that there is no oil in Odi. Odi
is in Bayelsa state, and Bayelsa is associated with oil.
40. Interview with Chief Edum Atata, Imiringi, Ogbia, 28 June 2002.
41. Interview with Eluan Ebelha, Anyama, 18 June 2002.
42. Interview with Moses Adolphus Ogbara, Elebele, Ogbia, 20 June 2002.
43. Interview with Chief Atata, Imiringi, Ogbia, 28 June 2002.
44. Interview with Daniel Udogu, Elebele, 22 June 2002.
45. Interview with Gabriel Michael Ogbara, Elebele, Ogbia, CDC chairman, 22 June 2002.
46. Interview with Gabriel Michael Ogbara, Elebele, Ogbia, CDC chairman, 22 June 2002.
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ABSTRACTS
The paper explores competing and often violent attempts to redefine ethnic group membership
in  an  Ijaw,  oil-producing  community  in  the  Niger  Delta.  The  proliferation  of  pan-ethnic
nationalist  movements  in  Nigeria  and  particularly  in  the  Niger  Delta  over  the  last  decade,
suggests that a certain degree of pan-ethnic cohesion or consensus exists amongst members of
the  ethnic  group  concerned.  The  paper  argues  that  the  question  of  ethnic  belonging  is  an
altogether more complex, widely contested and as yet unsettled one, in which the interests of
different generations and social classes collide. Micro-level studies reveal that instead of pan-
ethnic  consensus  in  oil-producing  villages  in  Ogbia,  there  has  been  an  unravelling  of  an
attachment to a pan-Ijaw identity and the emergence of new ethnic identities, which are more
useful in the immediate struggles over the spoils of oil at a village level. This points to the need
to re-evaluate our undertanding of ethnicity and of pan-ethnic movements more generally, in
this case those of the Ijaw, as non-static, dynamic phenomena, whose purpose and composition
can only be understood relative to the contexts within which they emerge and the audience for
which their discourse is intended.
Entre discours et réalité. Politique pétrolière et nationalisme ethnique ijaw dans le delta du Niger. — Cet
article explore les tentatives conflictuelles et souvent violentes de redéfinition de l’appartenance
à un groupe ethnique, les Ijaw, dans une communauté productrice de pétrole dans le delta du
Niger.  La  prolifération  de  mouvements  nationalistes  pan-ethniques  au  Nigeria  et
particulièrement dans le delta du Niger depuis dix ans montre qu’un certain degré de cohésion et
de consensus existe au sein des groupes ethniques concernés. L’article avance que la question de
l’appartenance  ethnique  est  une  question  complexe,  contestée  et  non résolue  où  entrent  en
conflit les intérêts divergents des différentes générations et classes sociales. Les études menées
dans la région pétrolifère d’Ogbia (État de Bayelsa) montrent qu’on n’observe pas de consensus
pan-ethnique à Ogbia mais, qu’on assiste, au contraire, au développement d’un attachement à
une identité pan-ijaw et à l’émergence de nouvelles identités ethniques qui sont plus utiles dans
les conflits immédiats liés aux gains tirés du pétrole au niveau du village. Ces observations nous
incitent à reconsidérer l’ethnicité et les mouvements ethniques comme des phénomènes non
statiques et dynamiques dont les objectifs et la composition ne peuvent être compris que dans le
cadre du contexte de leur émergence et de l’audience envers laquelle leur discours est destiné.
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